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Background: 
Artificial Intelligence has recently attained human-like performance in a number of 
‘game-like’ domains. These advances have been spurred by brain-inspired architectures 
and algorithms such as hierarchical filtering and reinforcement learning. OpenAI Gym 
is an open-source platform to train, test and benchmark algorithms – providing a range 
of tasks including classic arcade games such as DOOM. Here we describe how the 
platform might be used as a simulation, test and diagnostic paradigm for psychiatric 
conditions. 
Methods: 
To illustrate how Active Inference models of game-play could be used to test mechanistic 
and algorithmic properties of psychiatric disorders we provide two exemplar analyses. 
The first speaks to the impact of ageing on cognition, examining game play behaviours 
in a model of ageing where we compare age-dependent changes of  younger (n=9,  22 ± 1 
years) and older (n=7, 56 ± 5 years) adult players. The second is an illustration of a 
putative feature of anhedonia – where we simulate diminished sensitivity to reward. 
Results: 
These simulations demonstrate how Active Inference can be used to test predicted 
changes in both neurobiology and beliefs in psychiatric cohorts. As well as behavioural 
measures we show that putative neural correlates of Active Inference can be simulated 
and hypothesized (model-based) differences in local field potentials and BOLD 
responses produced. 
Conclusions: 
We show that Active Inference, through epistemic and value-based goals, enables 
simulated subjects to actively develop detailed representations of gaming environments 
and demonstrate the usage of a principled algorithmic and neurobiological framework 
for testing hypotheses in psychiatric illness. 
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Introduction 
Recent perspectives on psychiatric illness highlight the crucial role of computational assays 
in deciphering the complexities of mental illness (1,2). Computational assays of the cognitive 
and behavioural abnormalities that arise from psychiatric illness provide a formal mapping 
from complex thought disorders to putative neural substrates (3). The central proposition here 
is that cognition and behaviour are emergent features of biological processes and that by 
capturing these processes formally, we may better access the origins of psychiatric disease. 
Several computational frameworks have been deployed recently for the purposes of 
understanding neuropsychiatric diseases, including Bayesian learning (4), drift diffusions 
processes (5) and temporal difference models (6). 
Neuroimaging advances have provided useful biological insights into regional and 
connectivity deficits associated with mental illness (7) although these methods require further 
development to translate into pragmatic clinical tools for diagnostic and prognostic 
classifications at the individual level (8). Mathematical models that provide both individual 
brain and behavioural predictions are potentially even more powerful candidates to advance 
the field of computational psychiatry as they provide both algorithmic (information-
processing) and biophysical insights that link psychopathology and pathophysiology within a 
single framework (2). 
Reinforcement learning (RL) models with model-based fMRI (9) have predominated in this 
area, with neuromodulators and decision-making circuits in the striatum (10) highlighted as 
crucial neural substrates linking aberrant decision making and learning to psychiatric disease 
symptoms. Using this technique, simulated events, based upon an RL model, are convolved 
with a hemodynamic response function and correlated against BOLD fMRI signals to 
associate decision-making processes with the brain regions in which they originate (11). Here 
the aim is to produce regressors with powerful explanatory capabilities in terms of adaptive 
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reward-seeking and punishment-avoiding behaviours. The appeal of RL models lies 
predominantly in the expression of valence prediction errors and their association with mental 
disorders such as anhedonia in depression (12) and impulsivity in ADHD (13). Similarly, 
hierarchal Bayesian analysis has been used in conjunction with model-based fMRI to model 
prediction errors (14). Here, the focus is not specifically on reward or punishment prediction 
errors but errors in relation to prior beliefs about states in the world more generally. For 
example, Ahn et al (15) corrrelate choice behaviours with decision-time activation in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. When compared with non-Bayesian methods, this technique 
was found to provide more accurate individual and group estimates and modelling 
predictions. 
The (Bayesian) formalism provided by the free energy principle and active inference (16) 
stipulates that the brain should maintain a model of the world that can predict incoming 
signals from the environment.  A model that can minimize long-term surprise by making 
accurate predictions, will thus have high ‘model evidence’. In the current setting, resolving 
the moment to moment free energy of the brain, ensures the minimisation of long term 
surprise. The free energy in turn is made up of the differences between the model predictions 
and the sensed data from the environment (prediction errors) which algorithmically are scaled 
by the certainty of that prediction (precision-weighted prediction errors) (17). The free energy 
principle thus appeals to the dual goals of computational psychiatry as the neurobiological 
circuits required for this form of ‘active inference’ overlap with key anatomical features; e.g., 
precision-weighted prediction errors transmitted through cortical microcircuitry in the 
sensory cortices (18, 19). 
As introduced in (20) computational psychiatric approaches could be usefully understood by 
considering normative models and process models of the brain. Normative models refer to the 
mathematical or computational goal of the brain or agent – without regard for how it might be 
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implemented in the brain (e.g. learning), while process models refer to the mechanisms that 
might implement a particular algorithm (e.g. synaptic plasticity via LTP). Active inference 
accounts of brain function purport to do both. It comprises a general algorithm which might 
be the goal of brains (to minimize free energy) while also proposing distinct neurobiological 
components to implement the running of free energy minimization via distinct message 
passing sequences between prefrontal, sensory and neuromodulatory neurons (16). 
Importantly, elements of the belief update procedure within this modelling framework are 
constrained by variational approximations to Bayesian inference that have been mapped to 
putative neurobiological components or processes (21). However, it remains to be tested 
whether these distinct neurobiological processes do align with model inversion dynamics or 
whether such components of inference generalize from one task to another. 
The algorithmic framework afforded by the free energy principle may also be applied at an 
individual level, to characterize individuals with respect to their prior beliefs and preferences 
by fitting their choice behaviours to a computational model (22). Thus, given a sufficiently 
simple design for patient populations, where the task structure can be formalised, distinctions 
between cortical and subcortical effects on behaviour can be distinguished in the usual 
manner of using orthogonalized regressors (9). This framework deconstructs pathological 
behaviour with respect to individual’s generative model of a given task under the assumption 
that the parameterisation this model may be used to predict their behaviour under various 
cognitive protocols. This is pertinent to computational psychiatry in that features of 
psychopathology that are likely to arise from dysfunctional models of the environment, 
maladaptive learning or failures of inference (22) may be evaluated across different tasks and 
laboratories. 
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This paper is concerned with constructing and demonstrating the use of generative 
probabilistic models that can explain psychopathology – under the free energy formalism – to 
produce behavioural and imaging features that can be tested empirically at an individual level 
within a game environment. We use the OpenAI Gym platform (23) as it provides 
standardized tasks and computational environments, allowing for comparative models of 
behaviour to be shared across the reinforcement learning community. By altering the 
parameters of the generative model and therefore of the inference procedure, we aim to 
demonstrate with two toy examples how decision making may be altered in an identifiable 
way through neurobiological changes associated with psychiatric illness or ageing. 
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Methods and Materials 
The DOOM Environment on OpenAI Gym 
DOOM is a well-known pseudo-3D game that has been used as a platform for reinforcement 
learning (24) and computer vision (25). DOOM was chosen to demonstrate the versatility and 
potential for gaming environments and platforms such as Gym for computational psychiatry. 
It also provides a simple game scenario for comparisons of free energy and reward-
maximising schemes. To prepare the game for active inference experiments we construct 
three variables – the A matrix, B matrix and C vector. The A matrix comprises the agent’s 
belief about the mapping between sensory information and states of the environment; this 
mapping is simplified by deconvolving the pixel data into a set of manageable corner features 
using the Harris corner detection algorithm (42). Any suitable technique may be used to 
achieve this goal; however, within this environment it is reasonable to assume that the target 
will exhibit the largest number of corner features within the visual scene. This implies that 
the current state (position of the target relative to the player) can be defined as the location 
exhibiting the greatest response to the Harris corner operator. The B matrix comprises the 
agent’s beliefs about possible transitions between states under actions while the C vector 
comprises beliefs about expected outcomes, serving as a proxy for utility or reward.  A 
detailed description of gameplay and the DOOM state space is provided in the supplementary 
material while feature extraction methods are illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Human Play of DOOM 
To assess whether our simulated agents could attain ‘human-like’ performance we collated 
scores from a sample of real players, playing the same DOOM game. We measured the 
performance of 16 players, 8 female aged 37 ± 17 years (mean ± std). From these results we 
formed two sets of player data, comprising younger (n=9,  22 ± 1 years) and older (n=7, 56 ± 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Active Inference in the Gym 
 
8 
 
5 years) adult players for comparison with our ‘young’ (10-state) and ‘older’ (6-state, see 
supplementary materials) agents. These simulations were designed to represent and contrast 
simpler (older) generative models of the world with more complex (younger) models of the 
‘DOOM’ world. 
 
Manipulations to simulate features of Anhedonia 
Anhedonia is a behavioural trait of individuals with depression characterized by a lack 
interest in rewarding or pleasurable activities (26, 27). The anhedonic aspect of depression 
has been previously examined in a large reinforcement learning meta-analysis comparing 
learning mechanisms with reward sensitivity (12). There they found that among two 
alternative hypotheses of anhedonic responses (abnormal learning vs. diminished reward 
sensitivity), that diminished reward sensitivity most parsimoniously explained a large 
literature on reward-based reinforcement paradigms in depression. Under active inference, 
diminished reward sensitivity can be represented by adjusting the prior beliefs about expected 
outcomes (C vector) to reflect a less optimistic view of the world and the 'winning' state in 
the game of DOOM. This selection of prior beliefs in an ‘anhedonic’ agent effectively means 
that the agent is indifferent to any particular outcome.  The comparative analysis thus 
comprises a ‘motivated agent’ and an ‘anhedonic agent’ with identical knowledge of the 
environmental structure, but different prior beliefs about the outcomes or ‘goals’, illustrated 
in Figure 7A. Due to the form of the prior belief vectors, we can say that both agents know, a 
priori, 'where' the reward is, but the scale of the reward is reduced for the anhedonic agent.  
Our simulations would thus include the transitive effect of diminished reward sensitivity on 
learning – which is influenced by the states that are visited by the agent – and decisions to 
visit these states, which are driven by prior beliefs. 
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Simulating Neural Responses 
To generate neurobiological predictions related to symptoms of anhedonia and potential 
imaging biomarkers for depression that may be observable during gameplay we used the 
simulations from the agents above and analysed the belief updates over trials across 128 
episodes. This requires policies as well as past and potential future states to be ‘kept in mind’. 
Hence, these belief updates under the variational scheme may be represented in online, 
working memory areas such as the prefrontal cortex. We sought to test how alterations in goal 
states or expected beliefs about outcomes would alter state estimation and the prefrontal 
responses that could subtend this inference under a ‘motivated’ and ‘anhedonic’ set of goals. 
In our results we illustrate putative local field potentials (LFPs) and BOLD responses within 
the PFC and provide a guide for generating these simulated responses within the 
supplementary material. 
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Results 
Active Inference Builds More Complete Representations of DOOM 
Figure 2 illustrates how the simulated free energy minimizing agent plays the game DOOM 
and how it compares to a classic reward (goal) maximizing scheme (Eqn. 1 in Supplementary 
Material). In these simulations we report the reward and survival metrics returned by Gym 
over each episode. We assumed that the agent holds a 6-state representation of the game 
(Figure 3A). The agents began at episode 1 with the assumption that states map directly to 
outcomes, that selecting an action of ‘move left’, ‘move right’ or ‘fire’ will result in moving 
from any state to any other state with equal probability (equal entries of 1/6 in the B matrices) 
and that the desired state is state 4 (in the middle firing), with firing outside of range the least 
desirable states. Only policy selection depended on whether we used epistemic and extrinsic 
value (free energy minimizing) or only the extrinsic value (reward maximising, Eqn. 1 in 
supplementary material) to guide behaviour. 
Figure 2 shows one such instance from an agent that is driven by the imperative to minimize 
free energy and an agent driven by the imperative to maximise reward. Figure 2B illustrates 
the B matrices of each agent at timesteps 4, 16, 64, and 128. This serves as a visualisation of 
the agent’s emerging understanding of state-action dynamics as the they move through the 
environment. Interestingly, around trial 80 (Figure 2C), the agent’s performance begins to 
decline. This is due to the agent learning an incorrect state transition; most likely due to a 
failure of the Harris Corner detection algorithm (Figure 1). However, by t=128 the agent has 
relearned a full and correct representation of the environment, overcoming the earlier 
erroneous state transitions (Figure 2B). The learned state transitions under reward 
maximization are demonstrably less robust. Figure 2B (lower) shows that the agent has 
learned little about the causal structure of the environment, indicated by uniformity of the 
transition matrices. The agent has a lower average reward due to an inability to form an 
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optimal policy for navigating the environment (Figure 4). Here reward ‘scores’ are 
significantly lower over instances for reward-based decision making as compared to free 
energy-based decision making, p = 0.05 and for ‘survival’ scores where free energy agents 
complete the games earlier compared to reward maximizing agents; p = 0.04. 
Our simulations and illustrations of learning demonstrate that active inference outperforms 
reward maximizing policies. This is due to a difference in their respective cost functions. 
Active inference entails the simultaneous maximisation of two components: the epistemic 
value of an action (reducing uncertainty about state transitions) and the extrinsic value of an 
action. Under a reward maximizing policy only the latter is optimized. Hence the agent 
cannot achieve desired goal states with the same effect – since the agent is not driven to learn 
but only does so through trial and error, resulting in the decreased performance overall 
(Figure 4). 
 
Active Inference vs. Humans in DOOM 
To assess the ability of a free energy minimizing agent to ‘compete’ with a human player we 
enrolled 16 participants to play the game. In Figure 5, we show the survival scores from these 
games and compare them with the free energy agent, taking every other episode from the 128 
simulations above. We found that during the very early trials, the free energy agent is 
exploring and learning the structure of the environment before engaging in exploitative 
behaviour. This, alongside learning and then unlearning (Figure 2C) maladaptive behaviours, 
explains the slower transition to behaving optimally. However, matching human performance 
was remarkably fast, with the free energy agent attaining human-like performance after only 
12 actions (Figure 5). This indistinguishable performance was also retained throughout all 
remaining trials (p > 0.05). 
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Complex and Simple Models of the DOOM world and Ageing   
Given the importance of development and ageing in psychiatric disease onset (28) and 
recovery (29), as well as the notion of model simplification with ageing (30), we asked 
whether free energy agents can mimic age-dependent play in our human player cohort. We 
first described two free energy models that represent complex and simple models (Figure 3). 
We show that the simple model performs well (and equally well after 12 decisions) when 
compared to a human agent. 
From our human sample we compared play from 9 younger (37 ± 17 years old) with 7 older 
(56 ± 5 years old) participants.  To quantify the survival metrics obtained from the young and 
old participants we fit a quadratic polynomial of order two to these data. We found that over 
the course of 64 games, the survival metrics of both 6-state and 10-state models (Figure 6A) 
and to the older and younger human participants (Figure 6B) share features of change. 
Specifically, we find enhanced negative linear coefficients for the young compared to old 
human curves (young = -2.3, older= -1.5) which is recapitulated by the difference between 10 
state and 6 state agents (10 state = -4.1; 6-state = - 3.5). We also find that the second order 
quadratic curvature of these average survival curves are greater for the younger compared to 
older player games (young = 0.029; older = 0.016) – which again are reflected in the agents 
(10 state = 0.024; 6 state = 0.021). Overall this might reflect similarities in terms of learning 
efficiencies between the younger compared to older players and the more complex compared 
to more simple state-representations. 
 
 
Simulating Game Play under Anhedonic Priors 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Active Inference in the Gym 
 
13 
 
To simulate features of depression in simulated play, we developed a new agent whose belief 
in final outcomes was relatively flat (Figure 7A). In contrast, our ‘healthy’ or ‘motivated’ 
agent retained similar preferences to our previous simulations; believing that it would end up 
in front of the target, shooting it (Figure 7A). From 4 simulations of each agent over 64 
episodes, we found that on average, the motivated agent outperformed the anhedonic agent (p 
= 0.04). However, interestingly the anhedonic agent still learned the structure of the 
environment and sought out wins in later trials, indicating intact learning (data not shown). 
For neuroimaging predictions, we simulated putative neural correlates of activity in the 
‘prefrontal cortex’ of the anhedonic and motivated simulated players. We found that the 
amplitude of LFPs from the prefrontal cortex demonstrated a particular temporal excursion in 
motivated compared to anhedonic agents (Figure 7B). Overall LFPs had similar patterns 
within and over trials, with triphasic potentials for both anhedonic and motivated agents. 
Importantly this triplet reduced in amplitude for later potentials at a discrete point of learning 
over the episodes (Figure 7B). Crucially, the anhedonic agents displayed this qualitative 
change earlier in the learning episodes. Thus, the difference potentials exhibit an excursion 
around episode 20, with motivated agents retaining the larger potential triplet for a further 5 
trials (Figure 7B). This side-by-side comparison of two agents with different belief structures 
was replicated in 3 further exemplars, suggesting a consistent alteration in state inference 
strategy and a concomitant change in LFPs that can be systematically predicted and verified; 
e.g. using a time-frequency analysis of EEG or MEG for a particular player based upon a set 
of beliefs and behaviour. We then used these LFPs to generate BOLD responses within the 
PFC. Here the excursion is also marked, with the BOLD response exhibiting a second small 
peak at around 22 seconds after the beginning of the game, consistent with the timing of 
when the LFP response exhibits its qualitative change (Figure 7C). Overall, we can compare 
individuals in terms of their neural responses for alternative beliefs or goals, while 
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recapitulating similar forms at the group level; i.e. over different instances of these healthy 
and pathological agents (Supplemental Figure S3). 
 Discussion 
Here, we present a treatment of game play using a benchmarking framework – OpenAI Gym 
– and simulate changes in behaviour and brain responses associated with features of healthy 
neurological ageing and neuropsychiatric disease. Our simulations are based on the theory 
that living creatures, including humans, seek to minimise free energy (31). Importantly, both 
neurobiological and algorithmic components are interpretable within this framework and so 
alterations in abstract cognitive constructs such as ‘belief’ can be mapped to their putative 
neural substrates. This is important for modern computational psychiatry where a key 
assumption driving many computational deconstructions is that psychopathologies such as 
depression or addiction are likely to arrive from maladaptive alterations in neural circuitry 
which then subtend dysfunctional models of the environment, maladaptive learning or 
failures of inference (32, 33, 1). 
From our simulations, we find first that unlike an artificial agent that simply seeks to 
maximise reward, a free energy minimizing agent can develop an internal model of its 
environment (Figure 2). This suggests that superficial learning linked to the prospect of 
reward may not be sufficient for building models that serve as analogues for realistic human 
behaviour. We also compared our simulations to real human players. Although the 
performance of humans in this toy scenario will be trivial, it is important that the performance 
of free energy-minimizing (and reward maximizing) agents can be put into context in 
standardized environments to assess whether it is, in general, fit-for-purpose. Less trivial 
environments where optimal strategies are unknown or difficult to infer and learn should be 
used to test human performance. It should be noted that the Active Inference formalism can 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Active Inference in the Gym 
 
15 
 
be applied in a similar fashion to any paradigm where an agent within a closed environment 
must perceive, act and make decisions. 
Nevertheless, even in a toy task we can identify learning trends that may be reflected in 
ageing (Figure 6) and demonstrate how computational phenotypes and neural biomarkers 
may be elucidated from gameplay, with a focus on anhedonic features of depression (Figure 
7). A more detailed analysis may consider reaction time and other mechanisms of biological 
feedback such as eye tracking.   
It is not a trivial task to divide a domain, at any level of abstraction into discrete states a-
priori, but MDPs can be combined with continuous space and time generative models (34), 
which may offer scope for future active inference applications. We have manually discretised 
the game environments used in this work but the discretisation of internal representations 
through perceptual inference may also be the subject of future work. 
Games can provide a basis for testing memory, reasoning, sensory-motor capabilities and 
attention in individuals regardless of their physical and cognitive abilities or their age, gender 
or culture. The emergent nature of game play thus presents a constrained complexity that can 
be used to understand interactions between various determinants of an individual's behaviour. 
Comparing neuroimaging data with behavioural models rather than behaviour allows us to 
deconvolve complex psychiatric phenotypes that may be used as proxies for the hidden 
causes that drive aberrant behaviours; where a cause may conceptually encompass anything 
from an individual's prior beliefs and experiences to their neurobiological idiosyncrasies. In 
stroke, substance abuse and general-purpose motor rehabilitation, (35, 36, 37) game 
environments have been employed for recovery. Efforts are also being made to translate 
evidence-based interventions such as behavioural and exposure therapies to computer game 
formats (38). If game environments can be shown to facilitate changes in behaviours it 
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follows that changes in behaviour can be captured and potentially used to identify and 
monitor patterns of behaviour related to disease onset and progression. Thus, a gaming 
platform where participants have high engagement and compliance may be a useful adjunct 
in early intervention programs. 
Our simulations of changes in model properties and model parameters are designed to 
provide a proof-of-principle that active inference can be used for hypothesis testing in clinical 
populations. To illustrate these sorts of model-based predictions we appeal to general ideas in 
the literature regarding synaptic loss in ageing and ideas related to reward sensitivity in 
anhedonia. We do not aim to provide validation of these effects – but rather illustrate how 
data from a clinical cohort could be explored in the context of a principled theory of brain 
function. The rationale behind the comparison of 6 and 10 state agents to recapitulate game 
play from older and younger adults respectively is based on our earlier work on the free 
energy principle and ageing (39). Theory and data support the idea that synaptic loss over the 
lifespan may offer adaptive pruning, where simpler models instantiated in older brains are 
driven by top-down prior beliefs (30, 39). This in turn will make older brains more resilient to 
short term changes in environmental input and provide a more general purpose brain where 
‘the gist’ of an environmental challenge is readily identified. This is in contradistinction to 
younger brains which may over learn unimportant details of the environment’s structure. 
In simulating features of depression, we choose anhedonia where previous meta-analytic 
work had highlighted the importance of diminished reward sensitivity but intact learning 
from reward and punishment (12). It is important to note that we do not verify this feature of 
anhedonia but rather use it as a demonstration of how symptomatic labels in psychiatric 
illness may be mapped to model parameters. We find that we can simulate a small 
behavioural deficiency in playing DOOM, by flattening the prior belief structure. This is a 
close correlate of diminished reward sensitivity but casts the phenomenon in the future, not 
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the present. Of course, patients with depression do have a diminished optimism about the 
future (40) though here we aim to demonstrate that goal states represent not only desired 
outcomes but also believed outcomes. We therefore provide a testable hypothesis where 
diminished optimism observed in patients is related to diminished capacity to perceive 
alternative outcomes during decision making (41) –  under our framework they are the same 
thing. In future work this could be tested in a population of people with anhedonia – for 
example by using estimated prior belief structures from our model to predict individual 
optimism scores. 
Overall, we show that as a dual normative and process theory of the brain, active inference 
under the free energy principle may be used to reveal structure in behaviour and imaging 
markers in novel experimental settings, allowing clinicians and patients to gain a more com-
prehensive description at the algorithmic and mechanistic level, of mental illness. We also 
suggest that active inference may be a more sensitive model of mind as compared to more 
traditional reinforcement learning models in the literature. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Feature Extraction 
Observation from the gym DOOM environment in 480x640 pixel space corresponding to 
state 1 (top). This observation is cropped to 100x640 pixels, removing image features such as 
the ceiling and game information to allow more efficient processing of the pixel data (top-
middle). The location of the target in this space is determined by the Harris Corner detection 
operator (42), under the assumption that the target is present within the frame that exhibits the 
largest variation in (global) pixel intensity. Output from Harris Corner detection algorithm 
with local maxima of the corner response function highlighted in yellow (bottom-middle).  
We defined discrete ‘states’ of the environment by the location of the target (monster) relative 
to the player and whether the agent is currently shooting.  
 
Figure 2. Adaptive Behaviours and Learned Contingencies 
a)  An overlay of the positional states for both 6 and 10 state environments, note that the size 
of the centre state is constrained to the size of the target such that the fire action remains 
effective. b) Simulated agents underwent a single trial of learning. The B matrices shown here 
correspond to the 'Fire', 'Move Right', 'Move Left' actions at t=4, t=16, t=64 and t=128 under 
the free energy minimization (upper) and reward-maximizing (lower) paradigms. Each matrix 
represents the agent's belief about how the environment will change after making the 
respective action. For example, at trial 4 the Reinforcement Learning agent strongly believes 
that a 'fire' action will bring it from state 3 to state 4. The uniformity of the 'move right' 
matrix at the same time step implies that the agent has no knowledge of the consequence of a 
'Move Right' action. After 128 epochs of learning, the B matrices of the free energy agent 
have converged to those of the optimized agent presented in Figure 3A. The B matrix of the 
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reward-based agent is much sparser by comparison, reflecting a lack of knowledge about the 
environmental contingencies.  
c) Reward metrics collected from the free energy (upper) and reward maximizing (lower) 
agents in B. 
Figure 3.  Game Structure and Model Comparisons 
A graphical representation of the possible state transitions within the 6 (left) and 10 (right) 
state environments. Green lines denote optimal transitions from each state while red arrows 
denote possible but sub optimal transitions.  Any connection not shown is not possible within 
the DOOM environment, for example, it is not possible to move from a 'right and firing' (RF) 
state to a 'middle and firing' (MF) state without transitioning through the 'middle not firing' 
(MNF) state.  
Figure 4. Comparison of Free Energy and Reward Maximizing Agents 
Reward (left) and survival (right) metrics collected from 50 free energy (blue) and reward-
maximizing (black) agents. The mean total reward achieved by the free energy agents was 
significantly greater than that of the reward maximizing agent; p = 0.05. Plot shows mean +/- 
s.e.m. 
Figure 5. Comparison of Free Energy Agents and Human Players 
Human participants played 64 episodes of the DOOM game. The upper panel shows the 
average survival scores (lower is better) +/- s.e.m. These were compared to the free energy 
agents from figure 2 – where alternating trials from the 128 episodes were compared to the 
human’s 64 episodes. The lower panel shows a ‘Manhattan plot’, of statistical difference (-
log(p-value)) for each episode. After 6 epochs (12 decisions) the free energy agents attain 
human-like performance. 
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Figure 6. Simulations of Ageing 
a) Comparison of 6-state (black) and 10-state (red) free energy agents shown again for every 
other episode over 128 episodes. Plots denote mean +/- s.e.m. A quadratic polynomial fit to 
each average curve (6 state and 10 state) is superimposed to illustrate qualitative similarities 
with the human age effects. b) Comparison with ageing effects in human play. Similar to the 
simulated agents, older participants show shallower progression in the game over many 
episodes (Plots denote mean +/- s.e.m. with a superimposed second order polynomial fit to 
the mean). Linear trends in the data were more strongly negative for the younger cohort and 
the more complex state space model. 
 
Figure 7. Simulations of Anhedonia  
a) Prior belief structure for the ‘motivated’: green compared to the ‘anhedonic’: blue agents 
who carry a 10 state model. The anhedonic agent displays a flattened prior belief in the final 
state of the game, believing with less magnitude that it will kill the monster compared to the 
motivated agent. Behavioural performance was significantly worse for the anhedonic agents 
(p < 0.05); however, performance matched the motivated agents later across the 64 trials. 
Example of imposed trial timings for simulated agents. B) Local field potentials derived from 
state updates that evaluate previous current and future states under all allowable policies. 
Plotted LFPs are proposed to thus represent the prefrontal cortex. When comparing a single 
motivated to anhedonic agent the LFPs exhibit large differences around trial 20 and persist 
over ~5 trials. This finding was replicated in 3 other agent comparisons. c) Based on these 
LFPs we simulated the associated BOLD response from the PFC and show a second increase 
in the HRF around 20 seconds for the motivated compared to the anhedonic agents. 
Anhedonic agents exhibit a more protracted HRF. 
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Active Inference on OpenAI Gym: A Paradigm for Computational 
Investigations into Psychiatric Illness 
 
Supplemental Information 
 
Active Inference and Reinforcement Learning 
Active inference rests on a generative model of observed outcomes that can be optimized with 
respect to their variational free energy, an information theoretic construct representing the 
relative entropy between the true states of the world and models (of the world) in the brain. 
Recent formulations of decision making assume a partially observable Markov Decision 
Process (POMDP) form of the generative model (1, 2, 3, 4). This model defines the joint 
probability distribution over the observations, hidden states, policies (a sequence of available 
actions) and precision (or degree of belief in controllability of the environment). A graphical 
representation of the generative model is illustrated in Supplementary Figure S1. Here, a 
likelihood term establishes a mapping between hidden states and observations, defining the 
probability of being in a state after making an observation. This is referred to throughout this 
paper as the A or observation matrix. For our game play we assumed an identity matrix for A 
and leave uncertainty about hidden states to emerge in the transition probabilities. A hidden 
state may be thought of as the state of an entity or an environmental property that may not be 
directly observed by the agent; within the DOOM environment this corresponds to the relative 
position of the agent to the monster. This is because our feature extraction is imperfect, hence 
the agent cannot directly observe its position relative to the monster and the states are uncertain 
or ‘hidden’. The probability of transitioning from one hidden state to another is encoded within 
the B, or transition matrix. For example, if action k submitted from positional state i will move 
the agent to state j with absolute certainty, this will be represented in matrix form as B{k}(i,j) 
= 1, where all other elements in the row vector i will be equal to 0. Supplemental Figure S2 
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illustrates potential trajectories within the DOOM environment in matrix form. For our 
simulations below, we set each entry in each column of B to have equal values, i.e. the agents 
did not know the true environmental contingencies and had to learn them. 
Finally, the mapping between policies and hidden states are also influenced by the agent’s prior 
preferences, which determine how likely or rewarding a given outcome is. This critical quantity 
is denoted as the C vector and profiles the prior preferences or ‘end goal’ of the game. In the 
DOOM environment it should be maximized at the position in front of the monster firing. 
Utility, or the agent's sense of reward is quite literally the absence of prediction error; 'The 
agent will find this outcome rewarding' and 'the agent believes this outcome is likely' are 
equivalent statements. The probability of a policy also depends on precision γ and its 
hyperparameters α and β. Precision is related to the inverse temperature parameter from 
statistical physics and softmax response functions economics (but is optimized with respect to 
free energy over play) and determines an agent’s confidence in its decisions. 
Based upon the current form of the generative model, an action is chosen from a particular 
policy (  ) where that policy minimizes the expected free energy of the agent (Eqn. 1). To 
evaluate the expected free energy of a policy and select an action; i.e., whether to move left, 
move right or fire, the agent first must estimate its current, past and future hidden states under 
each available policy. In our simulations, we allow the agent to entertain short horizon policies 
(3-action sequences) and allow all combinations of such 3-action policies to give a total number 
of policies of 9 e.g. one policy may be {‘left’, ’left’, ‘left’}, while another {‘right’, ‘right’, 
’fire’}. State estimation also minimizes free energy according to Supplementary Figure S1. 
After a set of 16 iterative updates to estimate the states under each policy, a Bayesian Model 
Averaging procedure (5) is used to construct the final expected states in the past, currently and 
in the future . Using this estimate, the (negative) expected Free Energy of each policy is 
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calculated and passed through a softmax operator to select the current best policy and hence 
the current optimal action: ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘fire’. Within the softmax operation the precision 
parameter determines the agent’s confidence in the decision, which is itself updated at the end 
of each policy evaluation cycle (6).  
Under active inference a policy, at time , is valuable (has a high negative expected free 
energy, ) when it maximises the expected information (7) about the true state of the 
environment (i.e. maximizing epistemic value – first term expected under current state 
estimate) while maximizing extrinsic value (reward of getting to the preferred or believed final 
state – second term expected under current state estimate).  
 
  Eqn. 1 
 
What emerges is an adaptive agent that moves—purposefully—through an environment to 
solicit outcomes that it believes are most likely (i.e., the least surprising). For example, an agent 
might believe that rewards are likely outcomes and therefore act to minimise surprise by 
maximizing reward. Exploratory behaviours are encouraged in a principled trade-off between 
epistemic information and explicit value or reward (Eqn 1). This is mathematically what the 
Free Energy cost function does - without needing to recourse to ad-hoc exploratory features. If 
there is uncertainty in the environment structure, the agent will, by definition, explore to some 
extent.  
In the literature, the application of reward-based models to neural and behavioural data has 
previously evoked the difference between ‘model-based’ and ‘model-free’ reinforcement 
learning (8). Here the distinction is whether the transition matrices are explicitly learned 
through state prediction errors (model-based) or not (model-free). Thus, our reward-based and 
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active inference-based systems are both of the ‘model-based kind, whereby both are allowed 
to learn state transitions.  
Given this form it is easy to contrast active inference with reinforcement learning or simply 
‘reward maximising’ agents. For this comparison (Free Energy Minimizing vs. Reward 
Maximising), we simply remove the epistemic value term from the evaluation of the policy.  
To simulate DOOM play under active inference, we allow the agent to learn the optimal state 
transitions. Our learning scheme treats the model’s transition probabilities (B) as unknown and 
establishes beliefs over these unknowns in the form of Dirichlet distributions. The B matrices 
are updated after an action-observation cycle by incrementing at the observed state-outcome 
index. In this way, an agent will believe a state-outcome combination to be likely if it observed 
frequently. Using a set of ‘flat’ priors (i.e. each element of the matrix is set to 0.167 for a six-
state model and 0.1 for the ten-state model) enables us to establish how a simulated agent plays 
the game with no de-novo knowledge about the environment. As noted above the A matrix is 
set to the identity, while for the prior belief in final states, we set to C = [0.1, 0, 0.2, 0.6, 0.1, 
0] for the six-state model and C = [0.05, 0, 0.05, 0, 0.2, 0.6, 0.05, 0, 0.05, 0]. These prior beliefs 
about preferred states might correspond to how the game would be described by a human 
player; i.e., seek to be in-front of the target (states 3 and 5 for the 6-state and 10-state agents) 
then fire to win, (states 4 and 6 for the 6-state and 10-state model), while non-firing states are 
preferable to wasting ammunition (e.g. the zero belief in firing when the monster is on the left 
or right; states 2 and 6 in the six-state model, Figure 1b). For each artificial agent we simulated 
learning over 128 episodes and performed 50 runs to evaluate the average behaviour of the 
agent. 
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The DOOM Game Environment 
At the beginning of each game the agent starts in centre of the screen while the target can be 
positioned anywhere in front of the agent but constrained to the back wall. Each 'episode' is 
defined as the period between initialization of a game and the end of the game, triggered by the 
agent shooting the target or 10 seconds (350 frames) of game time elapsing. The agent can then 
move through the environment with left and right movements or can emit a shot, what we 
denote as a ‘fire’ action, i.e. there are three possible actions. 
The game metrics used to evaluate the performance of an agent are based on the total amount 
of reward obtained during an episode and the amount of time it takes to solve the episode. 
When a ‘fire’ action is submitted from the middle position, killing the monster, a reward value 
of 100 is returned. A negative reward penalty (-1) is imposed for every time step the agent 
moves or submits a 'fire' action from one of the left or right positions, meaning the agent loses 
points for staying alive while not solving the environment. The optimal solution to the task is 
thus to move in front of the target and then fire, resulting in a low number of steps and high 
reward score. In addition, the game returns a ‘survival’ score which serves to index the time 
taken for the monster to be killed.  
To ensure that no agent performs better due to chance (starting closer to the target state), the 
environment creation processes has been seeded such that each agent is presented with the 
same series of environments.  
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Human Players playing DOOM 
We recruited two groups of players comprising younger (n=9, 22 ± 1 years) and older (n=7, 56 
± 5 years) adults. Subjects were recruited from the campus of the University of Bristol – from 
students and staff. Screening of subjects relied on self-report of no psychiatric or neurological 
history via a participant information sheet. Each participant played 64 consecutive episodes 
where each episode consisted of self-timed button-press responses and ended either when the 
monster was killed or when the game timed out (though in practice no human player was timed 
out). The players were told that the goal was to shoot the monster whilst conserving 
ammunition and each episode resulted in a survival score commensurate with the simulated 
agent’s play. The buttons were ‘left’ ‘right’ and ’space’ for all participants however the 
mapping in terms of move left, right or shoot was scrambled for each participant so they had 
to learn the correct button associated with each of the three possible game actions. While 
humans will obviously understand the general structure of the task (i.e. have ready access to 
transition matrices once a few buttons are depressed), we added this component to introduce a 
minor and rapid learning phase (Figure 4). This was done to mimic some form of the unknown 
action-related state transitions within the learning simulations of the in silico agents. 
Ethics was approved by the Faculty of Biomedical Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
(FREC) at the University of Bristol.  
 
 
 
 
 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Cullen et al.  Supplement 
7 
Simulating Neuronal Responses 
In order to examine the putative neurobiological correlates of free energy minimization over 
game play we performed the following steps: 1. Before an action is selected, the agent will 
estimate its current state and future states based upon previous observations and the expected 
action-dependent state transitions. 2. This procedure comprises a state estimation scheme that 
uses iterative gradients to get a ‘best’ estimate of the current and future states. An 
implementation of this scheme ('spm_MDP_VB.m') may be found in the DEM toolbox of the 
academic software SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). 3. We assume the brain is doing this gradient descent. 4. 
Thus we take each gradient based estimate and assume that these fluctuations in estimates are 
directly mappable to firing in the prefrontal cortex 4. In order to simulate an LFP that may 
emerge from this computation we simple plot these estimates after a bandpass filtering 
procedure. 5. In order to do this we must assume a time associated with each computation – we 
choose a working time update of 16 msec. 6. Finally, to generate an associated BOLD response 
we pass the simulated LFP through a second function ('spm_hfx_hdm.m' also in the spm 
software package) based on a hemodynamic response function. This is a model of 
neurovascular coupling that maps local electrical brain activity to changes observed using 
fMRI (9). 
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Supplementary Figure S1. Separation between the DOOM environment (outer) and the 
agent's generative model (inner), formulated as an MDP. The agent is limited to one of three 
actions at a given time step (the action space is simply ‘move right’, ‘move left’, or ‘fire’) and.  
The 'state space' describes all possible states of the agent in the environment following the 
decision to emit an action. The state space in our simple 6-state DOOM models includes the 
states ‘left-of-monster, not firing’, ‘left-of-monster, firing’, ‘right-of-monster, not firing’, 
‘right-of-monster, firing’, ‘centered-on-monster, not firing’ and ‘centered-on-monster, firing’. 
The number of states the agent can occupy is thus relatively small, with a single stationary 
target state (‘centered-on-monster, firing’).  The inner figure demonstrates how the state 
transition matrix B, observation matrix A and prior expectations C influence action selection, 
belief updating and learning. Policy selection depends on the agent's prior preferences C and 
the prescribed precision γ. The B matrix provides a mapping between hidden states under the 
given action. The A matrix maps hidden states to observations and defines the probability of 
being in a given state after receiving an observation. Learning equates to updating B by 
accumulating evidence for real state transitions in consequence of action.   
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Supplementary Figure S2. Composition of 10-state transition matrices that reflecting accurate 
beliefs about the contingencies of the DOOM environment. 
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Supplementary Figure S3. Reproductions of ‘LFP responses’ generated by our model via 
state estimate updates during game play from an ‘anhedonic’ and a ‘motivated’ agent. We show 
that the motivated agent displays larger LFP responses centered around trial 20 which could be 
observed as BOLD differences using fMRI (see main text Figure 5 for another exemplar trace). 
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